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INTEREST ON INDIAN CLAIMS: JUDICIAL PROTECTION
OF THE FISC
HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN*
INTRODUCTION
The Indian policy of the United States has been a highly political
matter throughout the nation's history. Allocating the limited land,
mineral and water resources of the country between Indian and non-
Indian claimants has rarely been a simple or welcome task for the
federal government.' Decades of battle, both military and political,
have reduced both the quantity and quality of land held by American
Indians. Out of the conflict hundreds of claims for redress, at least in
monetary form, have arisen.
Originally, Congress conducted all negotiations with the Indian
tribes. In 1946 it attempted to avoid the political problems involved in
legislating upon Indian claims2 by creating the Indian Claims Com-
mission.' Originally conceived as an advisory body to the Congress,*
the Commission became the basic component of a system which attempted
to judicialize the awarding of compensation to Indian tribes.5 While
the Commission had broad jurisdiction over claims arising from past
injustices, it was given little substantive guidance in defining corn-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo, former staff attorney,
Indian Claims Commission.
1. The long debate over claims of Alaskan natives demonstrates this fact. See
Wyant, Sharing the Wealth of Alaska, The Oil Rush, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 14,
1970, at 19.
2. In his veto message to Congress regarding the Turtle Mountain Indians
Jurisdictional Act, which would have referred certain tribal claims to the Court of
Claims, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared that
[t]his would require the Court of Claims and Supreme Court to pass upon
questions of governmental policy in dealing with the Indians, and upon the
propriety or impropriety of the Government's action in specific cases. These
are questions of a political nature which, heretofore, Congress has consistently
refused to remit to the courts for review.
S. Doc. No. 179, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 10, 1934).
3. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 § 1, 25 U.S.C. § 70 (1964). In 1863
claims "growing out of or dependent on any treaty stipulation entered into . . . with the
Indian tribes" had been excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. Act of
March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 767.
4. See S. 1902, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937) ; H.R. 5817, 75th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1937). See generally 81 CONG. REc. 6238-67 (1937).
5. For a discussion of the judicialization of the Commission's fact-finding pro-
cedures, see Vance, The Congressional Mandate and the Indian Claims Commission,
45 N.D.L. REv. 325 (1969).
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pensable wrongs' or determining appropriate measures of compen-
sation.' The task of developing these concepts fell upon the Com-
mission and, through appellate review, the Court of Claims and Supreme
Court. The only guidelines available to the Commission and the Court
of Claims were earlier doctrines developed by the courts under various
jurisdictional acts.' Most of these jurisdictional acts, however, had
limited tribal claims much more narrowly9 than did the provisions of
the new Indian Claims Commission Act."0
The creation of the Commission enabled Congress to rid itself of
one of its most vexing problems concerning Indian claims-whether
interest should be paid on awards to tribal claimants. Since many of
the claims arose more than one hundred years before the passage of
the Act, the question had immense fiscal importance. Of all the complex
issues involved in formulating measures of compensation, the question
of interest loomed largest. In starkest terms, the question was whether
the federal treasury should assume the burden of interest which by
6. See Gila River Prima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 190 Ct.
CI. 791 (1970), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3025 (U.S. May 21, 1970) (No. 174).
7. See Washington Post, Jan. 29, 1970, at 3, col. 1.
8. Such acts were passed as early as 1881 when the Court of Claims was given
jurisdiction over claims of the Choctaw Nation. Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 139, 21
Stat. 504. For details of claims under many of these acts, see Hearing on H.R.
i198 and H.R. 1341 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1945).
9. See Klamath & Moadoc Tribes v. United States, 296 U.S. 244 (1935); Osage
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 66 Ct. CL 64 (1928), appeal dismissed & cert.
denied, 279 U.S. 811 (1929); Creek Nation v. United States, 63 Ct. Cl. 270, cert.
denied, 274 U.S. 751 (1927); Otoe & Missouria Indians v. United States, 52 Ct. Cl.
424 (1917).
10. The act defines the jurisdiction of the Commission as follows:
The Commission shall hear and determine the following claims against the
United States on behalf of any Indian tribes, band or other identifiable
group of American Indians residing within the territorial limits of the United
States or Alaska: (1) claims in law or equity arising under the Constitution,
laws, treaties of the United States, and Executive orders of the President;
(2) all other claims in law or equity, including those sounding in tort,
with respect to which the claimant would have been entitled to sue in a court
of the United States if the United States was subject to suit; (3) claims
which would result if the treaties, contracts, and agreements between the
claimant and the United States were revised on the ground of fraud, duress,
unconscionable consideration, mutual or unilateral mistake, whether of law or
fact, or any other grounds cognizable by a court of equity; (4) claims
arising from the taking by the United States, whether as the result of a treaty
of cession or otherwise, of lands owned or occupied by the claimant without
the payment for such lands of compensation agreed to by the claimant;
and (5) claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized
by any existing rule of law or equity.
Indian Claims Cmmission Act of 1946 § 2, 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1964). This section has
been interpreted as not only waiving sovereign immunity but also creating broad new
causes of action. See Otoe & Missouria Tribe v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 265
(Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955).
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this time totaled 500 percent or more.
Congress attempted to face the interest issue in 1940, subsequent
to two awards of interest by the courts. 1 It was proposed that no more
than six years of interest be paid on any one tribal claim." The Depart-
ment of Interior and other Indian spokesmen opposed the bill asserting
that the denial of interest would be constitutionally impermissible when
a fifth amendment taking of private property had occurred.' The bill
was never reported out of committee,' 4 and future proposals which led
to the creation of the Indian Claims Commission largely ignored the
problem of interest. It was left to the Commission and the courts to
determine, as a matter of legal principle, whether the treasury should
be protected from the interest claims. This article seeks to explore how
the issue has been resolved.
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
During the years of the exploration and conquest of the New
World, European nations devised legal principles among themselves
to govern the ownership of newly-found territory. Discovery and pos-
session gave title to the government by whose subjects or under whose
authority the discovery and possession took place. Aboriginal occupants
were not ignored; the title of the discoverer was subject to the rights of
the natives to possess and use their aboriginal lands according to their
own discretion. This was, however, only an usufructory right. Aborig-
inal occupiers had no authority to dispose of the land at their own
will. Furthermore, exclusive power to extinguish aboriginal use and
occupancy rights was vested in the government holding title to the land.'5
11. United States v. Klamath & Moadoc Tribes of Indians, 304 U.S. 119 (1938) ;
United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111 (1938). The Commissioner
of Indian Affairs stated that the bill was "provoked" by the sizeable judgments in these
two cases, and that "it seeks to avoid a repetition of such judgments in the case of
other Indian tribes." Hearings on S. 3083 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1940).
12. Hearings on S. 3083 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). The proposed bill also dealt with the question of offsets
against tribal judgments. The offset provisions became a reality in the Indian Claims
Commission Act, but the Act remained silent on the interest question. Indian Claims
Commission Act of 1946 § 2, 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1964).
13. Hearings on S. 383, supra note 12, at 21, 28, 65-66, 124, 137-38, 144, 210.
14. See 86 CONG. REc., pt. 19, at 670 (1940). There are suggestions in the hearings
that the proposals were channeled to the Judiciary Committee because it was doubtful
whether the Indian Affairs Committee would act favorably upon the bill. Hearings on
S. 3o83 supra note 12, at 58.
15. These doctrines were first developed by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), and Johnson Iv. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543 (1823). See also U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 593-601 (1958);
F. COHEN, The Legal Conscience, in SELEcTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 273-304
(L Cohen ed. 1960).
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The incidents of this aboriginal Indian title were refined largely
in the twentieth century. Recent court decisions have indicated that
these incidents included the concept that "aboriginal title" belonged to
those tribes which maintained exclusive" possession of a particular
area "for a long time."' 7 The United States owned the fee in land sub-
ject to aboriginal title and, therefore, could not become a trespasser on
aboriginally held lands.' Furthermore, the boundaries of the land to
which a particular tribe might claim title were not frozen at the date of
United States sovereignty over the land area involved."0
As the population of the United States grew, white settlers found
Indian lands attractive. Therefore, the federal government often negoti-
ated treaties with Indian tribes, taking a cession of tribal lands in
exchange for small payments and a reservation of other lands which
the United States did not consider desirable. Tribal rights to a new
reservation were often guaranteed by Congress.' When Congress by
treaty or statute granted permanent occupancy rights in a sufficiently
defined territory, the Indians obtained "recognized title" to such lands.2'
The policy of dealing with Indian tribes by treaty was ended in 1871.28
Agreements made with tribes thereafter required approval of both houses
of Congress, but legislation without previous agreement also was used in
16. Joint and amicable possession by two or more tribes, however, could not defeat
aboriginal Indian title. Sac & Fox Tribe v. United States, 315 F.2d 896, 903 n.11 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963); Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs
Reservation v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184, 194 n.6 (1966).
17. See Sac & Fox Tribe v. United States, 315 F.2d 896, 903 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963) ; Quapaw Tribe v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 283, 285
(Ct. Cl. 1954) ; Snake or Paiute Indians v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 543 (Ct. Cl.
1953).
18. Kwash-Ke-Quon Indians v. United States, 137 Ct. Cl. 372 (1953).
19. Sac & Fox Tribe v. United States, 383 F.2d 991, 998-99 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 900 (1967).
20. As to the nature of such rights, compare the following:
Even where a reservation is created for the maintenance of Indians, their
right amounts to nothing more than a treaty right of occupancy.
Northwestern Shoshone Indians v. United States, 342 U.S. 335, 337 (1944).
Those additional rights may be sufficient to spell out fee simple title in the
Indians if that is what Congress wished, or they may result in something less
than fee simple title.
Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 926, 940 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
21. See Sac & Fox Tribe v. United States, 315 F.2d 896, 897 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963) ; Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 175 F. Supp.
926, 936, 939-40 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
22. For a history of United States treaty making with Indian tribes, see U.S.
DET. OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 164-214 (1958). The definitive com-
pilation of tribal land cessions is C. ROYCE, INDIAN LAND CESSIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 18TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY, pt. 2
(1899).
23. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566.
1970]"
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dealing with Indian lands."
TREATY TAKINGS OF RECOGNIZED TITLE LANDS AND THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT
If Indian treaties ceding recognized title lands were considered
to be voluntary, consensual agreements, they might not be subject to
the fifth amendment requirement of just compensation. 5 It is ques-
tionable, however, whether these treaties were indeed voluntary. The
Indian Claims Commission Act appeared to destroy the mythology of
consent- by treating recognized title land cessions for unreasonably low
compensation in the same manner as agreements arising from fraud,
mistake or duress, actions which more clearly vitiate any element of
formal consent." If these cessions were in fact involuntary because of
unconscionable treaty terms, it would seem to follow that the fifth amend-
ment concept of just compensation, including interest from the date of
taking, would become the basis for determining the value of the tribal
claims. Such a result would not be precluded even if the treaties mani-
fested some elements of formal consent, since there still may be a fifth
amendment taking if the cessions were in substance involuntary.27
The suggestion that treaty takings for unconscionable considera-
tion violate the fifth amendment was reinforced by judicial interpreta-
tion of the Indian Claims Commission Act. To maintain a claim based
upon unconscionable consideration, the claimant was required to show
either actual fraud or a disparity of price2" so great as to amount to
"fraudulent conduct or gross negligence."2 Consideration was uncon-
scionable when "no reasonable seller in a willing transaction under
any circumstances"2 " would sell for the price paid. Thus, the courts began
to view treaty takings of recognized title lands as nonconsensual takings if
the compensation was inadequate.
With the question of the applicability of the fifth amendment
24. See U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 210-12 (1958).
25. See Albrecht v. United States, 329 U.S. 599 (1947) ; National Bd. of YMCA v.
United States, 396 F.2d 467 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
26. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 § 2, 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1964). This pro-
vision was to give the Commission authority "to go behind defenses frowned upon in
equity." H.R. REp. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1945).
27. See United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in the Country of Fairfax, 345 U.
S. 344 (1953).
28. Osage Nation v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 381, 421 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 896 (1951).
29. Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 694
(Ct. Cl. 1968).
30. Nez Perce Tribe v. United States, 176 Ct. C1. 815, 829 (1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 984 (1967).
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unanswered by Congress, the Indian Claims Commission and the courts
faced the task of developing neutral principles by which the amendment,
originally designed for occasional takings of comparatively small
amounts of property, could be applied to the taking of vast areas of the
continent.
Origin of the No-Interest Rule
Loyal Creek Indians v. United States3 marked the origin of the
rules on interest. During the Civil War, the Creek tribal government
allied itself with the Confederacy and ostracized those tribal members
who supported the Union. These Loyal Creeks took refuge behind
Union lines in Kansas.
A 1901 agreement with the Creek Nation"2 provided that the
claims of the Loyal Creeks for loss of their property in Oklahoma
would be submitted to the Senate. The Senate subsequently deter-
mined damages of $1,200,000. The House of Representatives, however,
objected to this amount, and in conference the award was reduced to
$600,000, which was ultimately turned over to the claimants. The
Loyal Creeks brought suit under the Indian Claims Commission Act
for the difference between the Senate award and the $600,000. On
appeal, the Court of Claims ruled that the treaty provided that the
Senate act as arbitrator and, having determined the amount of the award
in that capacity, Congress could not reduce that amount. The court
added, however, that the claimants were not entitled to interest on
the award."
Strong and relevant precedent supported the denial of interest.3"
Because the case involved the failure of the United States to pay a
judgment, the court denied interest, albeit in a hesitating manner:
If it were not for these emphatic expressions of the Supreme
Court, we would be inclined to think that such a departure from
fair and honorable dealing as is shown by the Government's
failure, for some forty-seven years, to pay a definite sum which
it had agreed to pay, would require it to compensate the plain-
tiffs by paying interest. In deference to the views of the Supreme
Court, we do not so decide. "
31. 97 F. Supp. 426 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 813 (1951).
32. Act of March 1, 1901, ch. 676, § 26, 31 Stat. 861, 869.
33. 97 F. Supp. at 431.
34. See Albrecht v. United States, 329 U.S. 599 (1947); United States v. Goltra,
312 U.S. 203 (1941). See generally D. SCHWARTZ & J. JAcOBY, GOVERNMENT LITIGA-
TiON 163-64 (1963).
35. 97 F. Supp. at 431.
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Application of the Creek Decision to Recognized Title Land Takings
In Osage Nation v. United States,6 the Court of Claims, citing
the Creek case, held that no interest is payable upon unconscionable
consideration claims under the Indian Claims Commission Act. The
case, an appeal from the Indian Claims Commission, presented two
alternative theories of recovery for the net proceeds in excess of the
$300,000 cession consideration paid by the government for tribal lands.
The petitioners objected to the use of these net proceeds for a "Civiliza-
tion Fund" to benefit all American Indians. One theory merely alleged
that the "Civilization Fund" amounted to a wrongful or unfair diver-
sion of funds by the government and that the treaty should be revised
to make these amounts payable to the Osage Nation. Under traditional
theories, however, a judgment under the wrongful diversion theory
would not bear interest because interest does not accrue on such govern-
ment claims. 7 The Osage Nation also asked for the difference between
the price it received for its lands and the fair market value of those
lands when they were eventually sold. Unlike delay in payment or
diversion of a liquidated sum, under this theory the Nation claimed
that the price did not constitute just compensation. The petitioners
maintained that the consideration they had received was unconscionable
in the sense that it represented neither the fair, the reasonable nor the
freely agreed upon value of the land. The court, however, failed to
distinguish between payment of funds wrongfully diverted or withheld
and payment for recognized title lands taken for unconscionable con-
sideration. Relying solely upon the Creek case, the court held that no
"taking" of the Osage's property in the constitutional sense occurred."8
The court, however, did not harbor misconceptions as to the true nature
of the Osage Nation's consent to the treaty terms, for it candidly noted:
If these Indians had been more versed in the ways of "civiliza-
tion" or had been represented, as were some other tribes, by
astute white attorneys, it would have been impossible to ser-
iously suggest that 34 cents an acre was a fair price for this
land. 9
36. 97 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 896 (1951).
37. United States ex rel. Angarcia v. Bayard, 127 U.S. 251 (1888) ; Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. United States, 175 Ct. Cl. 451, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 921
(1966). See SCHWARTZ & JACOBY, supra note 34, at 163-64. See also United States v.
Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 423 F.2d 346, 359-61 (Ct. Cl. 1970), suggesting
that interest might be payable and 31 U.S.C. § 547a (1964) relating to the investments
of trust funds by the United States.
38. 97 F. Supp. at 424.
39. Id. at 422.
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The opinion can only represent a political decision stating that the
sham formalities of treaty negotiation justify relieving the treasury
of the United States from fiscally unacceptable judgments.
Pawnee Indian Tribe v. United States" served to clarify the Osage
ruling. The plaintiff claimed interest only on the award for a small
portion of land excluded from the Pawnee reservation by an error in
the original survey. Upon discovery of the error, Congress appropriated
an amount to compensate the Pawnees. The Indian Claims Commission
found the award grossly inadequate when compared with the fair
value of the land excluded. The Commission, however, did not allow
interest on the judgment for the difference between the amount paid
by Congress and the fair market value. The Commission's rationale
was that an implied agreement existed between the United States and
the Pawnees that the land was taken in exchange for the payment made.
Again, sham formalities justified a denial of interest; the so-called
agreement resulted from the request by the government's own agent,
the Indian superintendent at Omaha, that the Pawnees be compensated
for their land rather than receiving back the land itself in order to avoid
interference with white settlement in the area.
Not only did the Commission find the facts of the Pawnee case
sufficient to justify the denial of interest, but it went on to hold that
no interest is allowable on any judgments under section 2, clause 3 of the
Indian Claims Commission Act 4' which provides for jurisdiction over
claims which would result if the treaties, contracts, and agree-
ments between the claimant and the United States were revised
on the ground of fraud, duress, unconscionable consideration,
mutual or unilateral mistake, whether of law or fact, or any
other ground cognizable by a court of equity .... ."
Thus, claims based upon fraud, duress and mistake, as well as upon
unconscionable consideration, were subject to the rule denying interest.
The Court of Claims affirmed the Commission's holding on this issue
with a cryptic analysis:
The United States thus acquired this acreage by purchase and
not by condemnation, and hence, plaintiff is not entitled to
interest."
40. 8 Ind. Cf. Comm. 648 (1960), affd, 301 F.2d 667 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 370 U.
S. 918 (1962).
41. 8 Ind. Cl. Comm. 648, 757 (1960).
42. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 § 2, 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1964).
43. Pawnee Indian Tribes of Oklahoma v. United States, 301 F.2d 667, 670 (Ct. Cl.),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 918 (1962). Two more recent cases shed additional light on the is-
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The theory of tribal consent, however illusory, would appear more
difficult to maintain in claims arising after the federal government
abandoned treaty making in favor of legislation in its dealing with
Indian tribes." Perhaps realizing this, the government consistently main-
tained that no fifth amendment taking occurred so long as some con-
sideration, however inadequate, existed or, conversely, that only a
taking without the payment of any consideration constituted the exercise
of eminent domain powers. 5 This contention, however, was rejected
by the Court of Claims in Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v.
United States."
Fifth Amendment Takings of Recognized Title Lands and "Good Faith"
The Fort Berthold claim arose out of two provisions of a 1910
statute" providing for the disposal of certain Fort Berthold Reservation
lands for the benefit of the Fort Berthold Indians. The statute provided
that prior to sale, a presidential commission would classify and appraise
the land in 160-acre tracts which were to be sold to homesteaders for
the appraised value. Of the 327,000 acre tract, 29,000 acres were granted
to the state of North Dakota at an appraised value of $2.50 per acre.
The court recognized in Fort Berthold that no semblance of tribal
consent could be found." Instead, the court substituted a test of "good
faith" for the previous test of consent and thereby avoided the issue of a
fifth amendment taking.
In short, it is concluded that it is the good faith effort on the
part of Congress to give the Indians the full value of their
land that identifies the exercise by Congress of its plenary
sue. In United States v. Delaware Tribes of Indians, 427 F.2d 1218 (Ct. Cl. 1970), the
court stated :
It is well established that the United States is not liable for interest in the
absence of a contractual or statutory requirement to pay interest. [United States
v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48 (1951); Pawnee Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma v. United States, 301 F.2d 667 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 918
(1962).] In line with this rule are the decisions that awards based on unconscion-
able consideration do not draw interest under the Indian Claims Commission Act.
Id. at 1222. In United States v. Creek Nation, 427 F.2d 743 (Ct. Cl. 1970), the court
reversed the Commission's award of interest on the basis of res judicata but affirmed
an award of the principal amount on the ground of mutual mistake of fact. See the Com-
mission's opinion at 18 Ind. Cl. Comm. 434 (1967) and 21 Ind. Cl. Comm. 278 (1969).
44. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566. See also U.S. DEPT. OF IN-
TERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 210-12 (1958).
45. See Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686,
695 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
46. 390 F.2d 686 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
47. Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264, § 1, 36 Stat. 455.
48. 390 F.2d at 689.
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authority to manage the property of its Indian wards for their
benefit. Without that effort, Congress would be exercising its
power of eminent domain by giving or selling Indian land to
others, by dealing with it as its own, or by any other act
constituting a taking.4 9
In this manner, the court introduced at least three revolutionary
concepts into the jurisprudence surrounding the fifth amendment. The
first relates to the power of Congress. According to the court's reason-
ing, Congress cannot exercise the power of eminent domain unless at
the same time it exceeds the power granted to the federal government.
It is obvious that Congress cannot simultaneously (1) act as
a trustee for the benefit of the Indians, exercizing its plenary
powers over ihe Indians and their property, as it thinks is in
their best interests, and (2) exercise its sovereign power of
eminent domain, taking the Indians' property within the mean-
ing of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. In any given
situation in which Congress has acted with regard to Indian
people, it must have acted either in one capacity or the other.
Congress can own two hats, but it cannot wear them both at
the same time."0
The principle that the constitutional delegation of certain powers to the
federal government immunizes the government from the restraints of
the fifth amendment in the exercise of those powers is quite anomalous.
While the proposition may be "obvious" to the court, it is no more
obvious to others than the assertion that a taking of land in order to
build a highway is not subject to the fifth amendment because the
federal government is exercising, in utmost good faith, its power to
establish post-roads."'
The second concept introduced by the Fort Berthold decision is
the novel principle that just compensation is solely a matter of legislative
motive rather than judicial determination:
[T]he [Indian Claims] Commission was of the opinion that
49. Id. at 693.
50. Id. at 691.
51. The court may have had in mind the distinction made in older legal writings
between the power of eminent domain and the police power. This distincion was generally
used in reference to state rather than federal actions. The distinction has been thoroughly
discredited as "almost useless, as it fails to suggest what acts will be regarded as coming
under the police power and what acts as coming under the power of eminent domain." L.
ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN 9 (2d ed. 1953).
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the lands sold to homesteaders were not taken from appellant
under the Fifth Amendment. We agree. The facts of this case
establish that Congress was not taking Indian land and giving
it to the settlers, but was making a good faith effort to trans-
mute Indian property from land to money by giving the Indians
the full money value of the land. . . . There is no evidence
or suggestion that the [presidential] commission did not
act in perfect good faith and do its best to find reasonable
prices.52
Thus, the court was concerned with whether Congress intended to give
the Indians the fair market value rather than with whether the Indians
in fact received the fair market value. In effect, the court denied the
power of the judiciary to review condemnation awards absent a showing
of fraud or bad faith. In so doing, the decision questioned the tradi-
tionally exclusive power of the courts to make a de novo determination
of the amount which constitutes just compensation.5"
The Fort Berthold decision appears to stand the fifth amendment
principle on its head by making the fact of taking depend upon the
compensation paid. Normally, a court decides first whether a taking
occurred and then whether the compensation was adequate. Fort Bert-
hold determined first whether the government made a good faith effort
to pay full value before questioning whether or not a taking under the
fifth amendment occurred. Finding a good faith effort, the court
derived therefrom a negative answer to its second issue.5"
Beyond the constitutional implications, the court threw into disarray
the relationship between unconscionable consideration claims under the
Indian Claims Commission Act and the awarding of interest for fifth
amendment takings. In determining that the government exercised
good faith in compensating the Indians for the Fort Berthold lands, the
court concluded that no fifth amendment taking occurred and that the
only claim was one based upon the unconscionable consideration clause
of the Indian Claims Commission Act. In order to sustain this claim, it
must be shown "that monies received from the sale of lands were so
far below the fair market value as to amount to fraudulent conduct
or gross negligence."5 It is difficult to imagine, however, how "fraud-
52. 390 F.2d at 693-94.
53. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893) ; United
States v. Bowman, 56 F. Supp. 109, 119 (D. Ore. 1943) ; United States v. 9.94 Acres of
Land in the City of Charleston, 51 F. Supp. 478, 481 (E.D.S.C. 1943).
54. 390 F.2d at 693-95.
55. Id. at 694.
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ulent conduct or gross negligence" can be established if the deter-
mination has already been made that the government exercised good
faith. It appears that the court thought that many unconscionable con-
sideration claims exist which do not involve fifth amendment takings.
Yet the court's tests are such that a finding on the issue of fraud vel
non determines both unconscionability and the existence of a fifth
amendment taking.
TAKINGS OF ABORIGINAL TITLE LANDS
Judicial Fiscal Considerations
The development of the doctrine that the interest is not payable
upon the taking of aboriginal title lands openly demonstrates the in-
fluence of fiscal considerations upon the development of Indian law. In
United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamook Indians,56 the Tillamooks
brought suit under an act which, unlike most of the earlier acts,5" gave
the Court of Claims jurisdiction over claims growing out of aboriginal
title.5" The United States claimed that the Indians were not entitled to
any compensation for the loss of their lands as they never possessed
recognized title granted by treaty from the government. The Court of
Claims, however, ruled in favor of the Tillamooks stating that "Indians
have a cause of action for compensation arising out of an involuntary
taking of lands held by original [aboriginal] title."59 The Supreme
Court upheld the court's decision stating that the fact of recognition
of title is immaterial if the claim of aboriginal Indian title
and an involuntary taking thereof is satisfactorily proved."0 The case
was then remanded on the issue of damages, and the Court of Claims
entered judgment for the value of the lands as of 1885 plus interest
from that date.6 ' The United States again appealed and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. In a per curiam decision the Court reversed,
finding that no interest was payable upon the award because none of
the former opinions had indicated that the taking was pursuant to the
fifth amendment.6 2
56. 329 U.S. 40 (1946).
57. The Court noted that
[iln only one act prior to 1935 had Congress authorized judicial determination
of the right to recover for a taking of nothing more than original Indian title;
and no case under that act, passed in 1929, reached this Court.
Id. at 44-45.
58. Act of August 26, 1935, ch. 686, 49 Stat. 801.
59. 59 F. Supp. 934 (Ct. Cl. 1945).
60. 329 U.S. 40, 52 (1946).
61. 87 F. Supp. 938 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
62. 341 U.S. 48 (1951).
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It should be noted that the second Tillamook decision need not
stand for the proposition that aboriginal title is not subject to a fifth
amendment taking. Indeed, it was not initially so read by the Indian
Claims Commission. In Assiniboine Indian Tribe v. United States,"8
Commissioner O'Marr found a more conventional explanation for the
decision:
The land involved in that case [Tillamook] was taken by an
Executive order . . . and the Supreme Court held . . . that the
recovery for the taking of the land was not grounded upon
the Fifth Amendment and disallowed interest. It has been
suggested that the ruling applies only to cases where Indian
lands held by original Indian title are taken through executive
or administrative action, and does not apply to such appropria-
tions of land held by the Indians under title recognized by the
Government. It seems obvious that whether the Indian title is
"recognized" or "unrecognized" it is only the right of occupancy
that the Indians were deprived of by the official action. There
would seem to be no logical reason for denying the Indians
the protection of the Fifth Amendment for the taking of lands
held under original Indian title by executive action and giving
such protection where lands so taken are held under "re-
cognized" title. As we understand the decision of the Supreme
Court it is the manner of taking that determines whether the
Fifth Amendment applies and not the tenure of occupancy,
that is, not on whether right of occupancy is based upon
aboriginal possession.14
The explanation that a taking without legislative sanction might not
constitute an exercise of the eminent domain power has solid founda-
tion in precedent, 5 although a closer examination of the authority
might reveal congressional ratification of a taking.6
The Supreme Court, however, arrived at a different interpretation
of its second Tillamook decision. In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States, 7 the Court declared that the fifth amendment does not protect
63. 2 Ind. C1. Comm. 272 (1952), aff'd, 121 F. Supp. 906 (Ct. C1.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 863 (1954).
64. Id. at 298-99.
65. United States v. Goltra, 312 U.S. 203 (1941) ; Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S.
322 (1910).
66. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 613-22 (1958). See also
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. United States, 401 F.2d 785 (Ct. C1. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1055 (1969).
67. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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against the taking of aboriginal title lands without just compensation.
After pointing out that the second Tillamook case discarded any sug-
gestion to the contrary in its first Tillamook decision, the Court said:
This leaves unimpaired the rule derived from Johnson v.
McIntosh that the taking by the United States of unrecognized
Indian title is not compensable under the Fifth Amendment.
This is true not because an Indian or an Indian tribe has no
standing to sue or because the United States has not consented
to be sued for the taking of original Indian title, but because
Indian occupation of land without government recognition of
ownership creates no rights against taking or extinction by
the United States protected by the Fifth Amendment or any
other principle of law.6"
While the Court purports to have found its rule in Johnson v.
M'Intosh 9 little in that early case supports such a conclusion. The
Court in Johnson merely held that enforceable ownership rights to
Indian title land cannot be conveyed by tribes to third persons.
An unusually candid footnote in the Tee-Hit-Ton opinion, however,
may present a more realistic picture of the Court's reasoning:
Three million dollars was involved in the Tillamook Case as
the value of the land, and the interest granted by the Court
of Claims was $14,000,000. The Government pointed out that
if aboriginal Indian title was compensable without specific
legislation to that effect, there were claims with estimated
interest already pending under the Indian jurisdictional act
aggregating $9,000,000,000.7'
Faced with the prospect of billions of dollars in judgments, the Court
may have felt compelled to overrule, sub silentio, its statement of a few
years earlier that "Congress, not this Court or other federal courts,
is the custodian of the national purse."'"
The Search for Historical Justification of the No-Interest Rule
The question remains whether there are other grounds for denying
application of the fifth amendment to the taking of aboriginally held
lands. Courts have ruled that certain rights to use land owned in fee by
68. Id. at 284-85.
69. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
70. 348 U.S. 272, 283 n.17 (1955).
71. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 322 U.S. 301, 314 (1947).
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the government do not constitute "property" as that term is used in the
fifth amendment. Examples of such usufructory interests are grazing
permits"2 and prospecting permits." Aboriginal occupancy rights, as
originally conceived, however, were more substantial in nature.
Chief Justice Marshall, in carefully tracing the British view of
such rights, noted that Great Britain claimed only "the exclusive right
of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell.""' The
King did not grant the right to take aboriginal lands by conquest in
colonial charters.
These grants [of charters] asserted a title against Europeans
only, and were considered as blank paper so far as the rights
of the natives were concerned. The power of war is given only
for defense, not for conquest.7"
This concept, however, was subjected to drastic change over the years.
As Chief Justice Marshall declared:
[P]ower, war, conquest, give rights, which after possession,
are conceded by the world, and which can never be controverted
by those on whom they descend."
Thus, in little more than a century Indian title became "permission from
the whites to occupy" traditionally held lands."7
After conquest they were permitted to occupy portions of
territory over which they had previously exercised "sover-
eignty," as we use that term. This is not a property right
but amounts to a right of occupancy which the sovereign grants
and protects against intrusion by third parties but which right
of occupancy may be terminated and such lands fully disposed
of by the sovereign itself without any legally enforceable
obligation to compensate the Indians."8
It was thus apparent that Chief Justice Marshall's negative answer
to the following question was no longer accepted:
Did these [European] adventurers, by sailing along the
72. United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 896 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867
(1951).
73. Acton v. United States, 401 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
945 (1969).
74. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544-45 (1832).
75. Id. at 546.
76. Id. at 543.
77. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955).
78. Id.
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coast and occasionally landing on it, acquire . . . rightful
dominion over the numerous people who occupied it? Or has
nature, or the great Creator of all things, conferred these rights
over hunters and fishermen, or agriculturists and manufac-
turers ?"
In the eyes of a twentieth century court these Europeans had, indeed,
acquired dominion over the lands of aboriginal occupants.
Justice Reed's Tour de Force and the Concept of Aboriginal Title
The Tee-Hit-Ton decision establishes the doctrine that no fifth
amendment taking is involved when the land taken is held by arboriginal
title."0 Fifth amendment principles are applied, however, to takings of rec-
ognized title lands.8" Yet, until well into the twentieth century, the courts
made little distinction between the two types of land tenure.8 2 The ques-
tion remains whether there is any historical justification for this distinc-
tion which exempts from the protection of the fifth amendment all lands
for which the Indians have not obtained "recognized" title."
In 1896 the Supreme Court described the incidents of aboriginal
title as follows:
It has been settled by repeated adjudications of this court that
the fee of the lands in this country in the original occupation
of the Indian tribes was from the time of the formation of
this government vested in the United States. The Indian title
as against the United States was merely a title and right to
the perpetual occupacy of the land with the privilege of using
it in such mode as they saw fit, until such right of occupation
had been surrendered to the government. When Indian reser-
79. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832).
80. See notes 67-70 supra and accompanying text.
81. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937) ; Unitah & White River
Band of Ute Indians v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 953 (Ct. CI. 1957); Assiniboine
Tribe v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 906 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 863 (1954) ;
Blackfeet & Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 161 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 35 (1954).
82. The legislative history of the Indian Claims Commission Act may be inter
preted as calling for identical treatment of aboriginal and recognized title claims. In a
case in which it denied interest on an aboriginal title claim, the Indian Claims Commission
said in regard to another issue:
Thus the Commission was to act as did courts of equity in granting just remedies
which were otherwise precluded by technical legal rules. The unequal
treatment of Indians possessing land under Indian title and those holding rec-
ognized title is the consequence of one of those technical legal rules.
Washoe Tribe v. United States, 21 Ind. Cl. Comm. 447, 457 (1969).
83. For the definitions of aboriginal and recognized title, see notes 15-24 supra and
accompanying text.
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vations were created, either by treaty or executive order, the
Indians held the land by the same character of title, to wit, the
right to possess and occupy the lands for the uses and purposes
designated. 4
Even as late as 1941 the Court of Claims declared:
This treaty gave the Sioux Nation a permanent reservation
to the lands described thereunder. The Indian Nation possessed
the use and occupancy of this reservation and, as has been
repeatedly held, this was equivalent to an Indian title and
therefore was in the nature of a cession by the United States
of this territory to the Indian Nation. It is unquestioned that
the United States retained the fee simple in all Indian lands.8 5
Thus, it is not surprising that in his classic opinion granting interest
for the taking of certain reservation lands, Justice Cardozo made no
distinction between recognized and aboriginal title lands:
Confusion is likely to result from speaking of the wrong to
the Shoshones as a destruction of their title. Title in the strict
sense was always in the United States, though the Shoshones
had the treaty right of occupancy with all its beneficial
incidents. . . . The right of occupancy is the primary one to
which the incidents attach, and division of the right with
strangers is an appropriation of the land pro tanto, in substance
if not in form.
The right of the Indians to the occupancy of the lands
pledged to them, may be one of occupancy only, but it is "as
sacred as that of the United States to the fee."8
While Justice Cardozo traced his quotation regarding the sacredness
of occupancy rights back to 1874,87 the Supreme Court had, as early
as 1835, applied the same language to aboriginal title lands.
[I]t is enough to consider it as a settled principle that their
right of occupancy is considered as sacred as the fee simple of
the whites.88
84. Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 402-03 (1896) (emphasis added).
85. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 94 Ct. CI. 150, 166 (1941).
86. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 496-98 (1937).
87. Justice Cardozo quotes and cites United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
593 (1874).
88. Mitchell v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835).
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In the light of these decisions, Chief Justice Vinson's reasoning in
the first Tillamook case was hardly revolutionary:
The older cases explaining and giving substance to the Indian
right of occupancy contain no suggestion that only "recognized"
Indian title was being considered. Indeed, the inference is
quite otherwise. 9
Justice Reed, however, joined by Justices Rutledge and Burton in his
dissenting opinion, disagreed arguing that
[w]hile Indians were permitted to occupy these lands under
their Indian title, the conquering nations asserted the right
to extinguish that Indian title without responsibility to com-
pensate for his loss.90
In support of his statement Justice Reed cited the 1783 Treaty of
Paris"' which, he said, "confirmed the sovereignty of the United States
without reservation of Indian rights."92 While Chief Justice Marshall
had stated that after the American Revolution, Indians "assumed the
relation with the United States which had before subsisted with Great
Britain,"9 Justice Reed suggested that the United States had made an
abrupt departure from that policy 4 and adopted the view held by
colonial France.9"
In 1671, the Intendent of New France called together the repre-
sentatives of fourteen Indian tribes at Sault Ste. Marie, and in their
presence
erected there a post to which he affixed the King's arms, and
declared to all those people that he had convoked them in
order to receive them into the King's protection, and in his
name to take possession of all their lands, so that henceforth
ours and theirs should be but one.99
By this ceremony, the French considered that tribal occupancy rights
89. 329 U.S. 40, 52 n.30 (1946).
90. Id. at 58.
91. 8 Stat. 80 (1783).
92. 329 U.S. at 58 n.6.
93. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832).
94. This opinion had been foreshadowed by Justice Reed's opinion in Northwestern
Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 337 39 (1945).
95. See Thomas, Introduction to C. ROYCE, INDIAN LAND CESSIONS IN THE UNITE!
STATES, 18TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY, pt. 2, 545-
59 (1899) [hereinafter designated as THOMAS INTRODUCTION TO ROYCE].
96. Denonville, Memoir on the French Limits in North America, IX NEW YORK
COLONIAL DOCUMENTS 383, as reprinted in THOMAS INTRODUCTION TO RoYcE at 546-47.
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passed absolutely to the Crown."
Justice Reed apparently considered that British relinquishment of
claims to property rights in the United States in the Treaty of Paris 8
similarly passed tribal occupancy rights absolutely to the United States.
Thereafter, in his view, Indians were permitted to remain on the land
as an act of grace. Apparently, it was Justice Reed's contention that
since the Treaty of Paris did not mention the status of Indian rights in
America, the United States' ratification of the treaty was a rejection of
the view of aboriginal ownership held by England, Spain and the
Netherlands99 in favor of France's position.
Historical evidence is exactly to the contrary. In August, 1789,
President Washington forwarded to Congress a report from Secretary
of War Knox, which stated in part:
By having recourse to the several Indian treaties, made
by the authority of Congress, since the conclusion of the war
with Great Britain, excepting those made January 1789, at Fort
Harmar, it would appear, that Congress were of opinion,
that the Treaty of Peace, of 1783, absolutely invested them
with the fee of all the Indian lands within the limits of the
United States; that they had the right to assign, or retain
such portions as they should judge proper.
97. THOMAS INTRODUCTION TO ROYCE at 547.
98. Article I of the Treaty merely provides:
His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States . . . to be free,
sovereign and independent states; that he treates with them as such; and for
himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the government,
propriety and territorial rights of the same, and every part thereof.
8 Stat. 80, 81 (1783).
99. See THOMAS INTRODUCTION TO ROYCE 538-45, 549-61, 575-78. Of the
European nations, Spain most clearly expressed its recognition of the absolute right of
Indian inhabitants to lands they occupied. Two provisions of the Reconiliacion de las
Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias illustrate this. In a law which restored to the Spanish
crown lands in "the dominion of the Indians" those lands held "without just and true
titles," it was provided that
after distributing among the Indians whatever they may jtistly want to cul-
tivate, sow and and raise cattle, confirming to them what they now hold, and
granting what they may want besides-all the remaining land may be reserved
to us.
Id. at 541. Another provision directed that Europeans desiring to establish a colony
should persuade the natives "by mild means" to allow the settlement. If the Indians do
not consent
the settlers, after having notified them . . . shall proceed to make their settle-
ment without taking any thing that may belong to the Indians, and without doing
them any greater damage than shall be necessary for the protection of the settlers
and to remove obstacles to the settlement.
Id. at 540. See also United States v. Northern Paiute Nation, 393 F.2d 786 (Ct. Cl.
1968).
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But it is manifest, from the representations of the con-
federated Indians at the Huron village, in December, 1786,
that they entertained a different opinion, and that they were
the only rightful proprietors of the soil; and it appears by the
resolve of the 2d July, 1788, that Congress so far conformed
to the idea, as to appropriate a sum of money solely to the
purpose of extinguishing the Indian claims to lands they had
ceded to the United States, and for obtaining regular convey-
ances of the same. This object was accordingly accomplished at
the treaty of Fort Harmar, in January, 1789.
The principle of the Indian right to the lands they possess
being thus conceded, the dignity and interest of the nation will
be advanced by making it the basis of the future administration
of justice towards the Indian tribes.'
Moreover, the Treaty of Paris was consistent with prior British practice
of ignoring Indian rights in documents between Europeans unless
forced by an actual problem to include them. 0'
In a recent decision' the Court of Claims faced the issue of whether
Texas, while an independent republic, had accorded aboriginal use and
occupancy rights to Indians. The court pointed out that
the law of the prior sovereigns (Spain, Mexico, and to a
limited degree France) accepted aboriginal ownership, and
that all the colonizing European powers took the same position.
Only a convincing demonstration could show that the
Republic of Texas uniquely departed from this consensus
of the whole western world. 3
If a similar standard of "convincing demonstration" is applied in order
to define the extent to which the United States adopted pre-existing
aboriginal title doctrines, it is submitted that the Treaty of Paris will not
suffice to show clearly that the United States asserted absolute ownership
to Indian lands.
The Supreme Court, however, in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States rejected the contention that the fifth amendment applies to takings
100. Report Relative to the Northwestern Indians, June 15, 1789, IV AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS (Class II, 1832) 12, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., Doc. No. 2 (Aug. 7, 1789).
101. See THOMAS INTRODUCTION TO ROYCE at 555.
102. Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487 (1967).
103. Id. at 493.
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of aboriginal title lands.' 4 Justice Reed, his view of history prevailing,"0 5
spoke for a majority of five justices. The first Tillamook.. decision was
explained as a statutory direction to pay for aboriginal title.' Justice
Black in Tillamook had advanced this theory'"8 and was specifically re-
jected by both the majority and minority.' In Tee-Hit-Ton, Justice
Black joined the majority."0 This opinion, with its apparent advertence
to fiscal consideration,"' finally divested aboriginal title of its "sacred-
ness."
CONCLUSION
The tortuous history of Indian litigation forces the inevitable con-
clusion that the courts have been less than candid in explaining their
decisions. Where the Indians held recognized title to land taken by
white settlers, the courts have either fictionalized the nature of the
agreement by injecting a false consent".2 or subjected fifth amendment
doctrines to contortive reasoning." 8 Where the takings have been of
aboriginal title land, interest and, indeed, the constitutional necessity for
any compensation have been avoided by creation of the historically un-
sound distinction between aboriginal title and recognized title in reference
to fifth amendment issues."'
The allowance of interest on only small classes of claims eliminated
politically unacceptable judgments while paying lip-service to the fifth
amendment. While it has become fashionable to attribute such decisions
to "result-oriented" jurists who have forsaken "principled decision,""' 5
an examination of history indicates that the blame lies with legislators
who have abdicated the responsibility of resolving difficult political
problems.
By enacting various jurisdictional acts and the Indian Claims
Commission Act, Congress decided that economic wealth should not be
allocated between Indian tribes and the federal government on the basis
104. See notes 67-71 supra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 90-95, 98-99 supra and accompanying text.
106. 329 U.S. 40 (1946).
107. 348 U.S. at 284.
108. 329 U.S. at 54-55.
109. Id. at 45, 46.
110. By the time of the Tee-Hit-Ton decision, Justices Vinson, Murphy and Rut-
ledge had been succeeded by Justices Warren, Minton and Clark. Justices Warren,
Douglas and Frankfurter dissented in Tee-Hit-Ton.
111. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
112- See notes 36-45 supra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 47-55 supra and accompany text.
114. See notes 56-111 supra and accompanying text.
115. See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 81-100 (1970).
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of military strength. By failing to establish guiding principles for such
redistribution, the legislature created a vacuum making future confusion
inevitable.11
116. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocEss 395-98 (Tent. ed. 1958).
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